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Abstract
The economic activity of the countries which make up the European Union (EU)
is being profoundly affected by the advance in the process of integration. The effect of
this process on the development of the regions, in itself already unequal, has caused
growing concern about the reinforcement of economic and social cohesion within the
EU, as was reflected in the Treaty of the European Union. In this way, the steps taken
towards a growing integration are complemented by a greater development of structural
policies. The reinforcement of these policies, and in particular of regional policy,
confers special importance to the analysis of its instruments, above all, to that of the
programmes for regional economic incentives.
Economic incentive programmes constitute one of the most widely used tools of
regional policy among the member nations of the EU. Given the fact that this assistance
is aimed at companies, it is subject to meet Community regulations on competition and,
at the same time, as a measure for regional development, play a role in the attainment of
economic and social cohesion. In this paper the most important aspects of this last
component will be analyzed in terms of regional assistance in order to then proceed to
the study of its effects on the correction of interregional inequality.
1. Introduction1
European countries have developed their own regional policies even before the
beginning of the integration process. Nowadays, these policies remain and, therefore,
coexist with the community regional policy developed by the Structural Funds.
Each country designs its own regional incentives programmes and establishes,
among others, the zones which are going to be subsidized and the maximum limits of
the aids that can be conceded.
But, do the Member States have freedom to define what zones or regions can be
susceptible to receive regional aids, as well as their intensity? The answer is negative
due to the fact that regional aids, as any other State aid, can distort competition and the
free trade in the European Union (EU) Single Market. This is the reason why every
regional aid programme applied in the EU countries are controlled by the European
Competition Policy. This policy will allow the use of this instrument in case of regional
problems that justify its application, always respecting specific principles and rules of
performance.
  Now then, what the regional incentives programmes applied in a State are
looking for is finishing with the spatial differences in that country. Although they are
controlled by a Community policy, their perspective is national. In addition, a certain
difference between regions which can receive this type of aids and regions which can
get benefits from the Structural Funds has been traditionally in existence. This has
started a discussion on the need of getting bigger coherence between the regional aids
and the Structural Funds maps, as a way to reach an increased economic and social
cohesion in the EU. Precisely, the European Commission has published now the new
Guidelines on regional aids (OJ C 74, 10.3.1998), whose application will coincide with
the new period of the Structural Funds Programme since year 2000.
As we will see, there is a clear aim to reach a higher co-ordination between the
Community regional policy and the State Members’ ones. This is an aspect also seen in
the Commission’s “Agenda 2000” (Comisión Europea, 1997b) and in its2
Communication to the Member States about the links between regional and competition
policy (OJ C90, 26.3.1998).
In this paper, we will first analyse the main characteristics of the regional
incentives programmes in the EU. Secondly, we will study their control by the European
Competition Policy, paying attention to the changes expected for year 2000. Finally, we
will summarize the main consequences of these changes on the economic and social
cohesion of the EU.
2. Main Characteristics of the Regional Incentive Programmes in Europe.
Since the fifties, European Governments have thought about the need of
reducing their respective territorial unbalances. For two decades, the instruments used to
reach that aim were infrastructures investments, economic incentives and, although to a
smaller extent, the application of desincentives, in regions with congestion problems, or
the setting-up of public companies to act as drive of the regional economic
development. In this stage, incentives were the key instrument of the regional policy in
each Member State.
The regional economic incentives are financial and fiscal aids guided to
estimulate firms activity in areas with problems. They do that through the establishment
of new enterprises as well as by spreading and improving the already existing ones.
Therefore, it is a question of inducing the capital investment in the assisted areas,
compensating their lacks with economic aids. Among these lacks, we could point up the
need for qualified labour force, the scarcity of external economies, the absence of
industrial tradition or a distanced location from the growth centres.
The evolution of the European economies since the seventies will bring along
important changes in the conception and scoring of the regional policy. Specifically, the
economic crisis during the seventies and early eighties and the structural changes caused
are going to affect, to a great or small extent, all the European regions which, among
others, will observe increases in their unemployment rates.3
In this context, the regional policy becomes less important in the national
economic policy. The budget restrictions will determine the need for a fewer
expenditure and this, with the change in the attitude to subsidies, will carry out a more
selective plan of the regional development. Also, due to the generalization of economic
growth problems, the main objective of the regional policy is now to establish  the
conditions to reach a sustained economic growth in all regions.
The changes relative to the objectives of the regional policy have a reflection in
the instruments used. We could also speak about a reorientation of them. In fact, some
of the measures used before have been abandoned, such as the application of
disincentives or the setting-up of public companies, and we could emphasize some new
lines of action, like services to firms, technological development and formation policies.
But the main instruments of the traditional regional policy, infrastructure investments
and economic incentives programmes to firms, have not been abandoned, although their
use has been adapted to the new situation.
Particularly, the incentives, key instrument of the regional policy in the previous
stage, can still be emphasized at present. Now, its conception has been adapted, as
pointed before, to the new objectives of the regional policy at a national level. The aim
of this adjustment is to face the structural changes required in a moment in which the
Member States have more limited resources, due to the strong budget restrictions which
determine the development of this and other policies.
Although each country in the EU has its own regional aid programmes, all of
them have evolved in a quite similar way. Then, we are able to detect some common
characteristics among them:
1. The prevalence of financial incentives as contrasted with fiscal incentives,
since the eighties, constitutes the first trend. The last ones are only conceded,
in a residual way, in France, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg.
There are three elements that have motivated this evolution: (i) The fact that
fiscal incentives, because of their nature, tend to be managed by national4
authorities. This often interferes with its inclusion as a specifically regional
component. (ii) Secondly, financial incentives are more transparent when
measuring the effect of both types of aids on the internal rate of return. It has
been found that this estimate is more difficult in the case of fiscal incentives.
(iii) Finally, financial incentives are more suitable when firms have financial
problems and have to have recourse to the capital markets. We cannot forget
that many companies have problems due to an inadequate relationship
between their own resources and the external ones and, therefore, to a great
dependence on the capital markets.
2.  The most common financial incentives are capital subsidies. While they are
the main type of incentive in every European country, labour subsidies are
only conceded in France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and Northern
Ireland. In addition, the trend is to concede the last ones exclusively to small
firms or to the service sector. This is reasonable, somehow, because if we
seek to improve firms and sectors competitiveness in the long term, capital
subsidies are the most appropriate ones. And the reason for this is that, by
encouraging its acquisition, they also facilitate the incorporation of
technological progress and, therefore, the modernization of the productive
system.
 
3.  Another trend, since the eighties, has been the gradual knockout of the
automatic schemes and the incorporation of more discretionary regional
incentives, with a limited budget. In fact, there are only automatic
programmes, exclusively related to fiscal incentives, in Germany, France and
Greece, while in this last country, Netherlands and Portugal, the automatic
incentives coexist with the discretionary ones in the concession of financial
incentives. For the rest Member States, the system is discretionary.
 
To understand this change, it is necessary to take into account an essential
element, which determines the concession of State aids: the budget
restrictions of the Member States. In this context, discretionary schemes
facilitate a greater and also better expenditure control, as they allow the5
selection of those really interesting projects, as well as the adaptation of the
incentives amount in each particular case, thanks to the realization of a
previous study. Furthermore, this individualized analysis, in each case,
establishes the possibility of choosing additional projects, or those which
would not be carried out in the same way without grant. The main
disadvantage of this system is that they are more expensive and complex to
manage than the automatic ones.
 
4.  Also related to the administration of regional incentives programmes, there is
a growing degree of descentralization. This presents clear advantages, such as
a better adequacy with the specific characteristics of the region and a quicker
and more flexible incentives management. But it also presents some risks that
we cannot forget, which are basically centred in the possibility of competition
between regions. This feasible “war” between regions bring us to think that
managerial descentralization of incentives programmes should not be
complete, keeping certain responsibilities at the central level. This one should
take charge of setting maximum aid limits, as well as a set of general
conditions to obey, taking also charge on the greater dimension projects.
 
5.  Finally, in relation to their sectorial coverage, the European regional
incentives approach mainly to manufactures, and also to services. For this last
case, aids are focussed in those tertiary activities whose location does not
depend on local markets, in firm services and in Research and Development
(R&D) activities. Generally, the types of projects granted are those related to
new establishments, enlargements, relocations and modernizations, although
these last ones use to be subject to very strict conditions. Lastly, the minimum
dimension of the eligible projects has increased.
Therefore, we find ourselves faced to a more selective plan, not only in the
programmes creation and management, but also in its sectorial coverage and in the
conditions required.6
The per capita incentive expenditure in assisted regions in each Member State
constitutes a representative indicator of the financial effort achieved by the Member
States through their regional aid programmes.
The First Report of the Commission about the economic and social cohesion
refers to the annual average per capita expenditure in the beneficiary areas for the
period 1989-1993 (Comisión Europea, 1997a, pages 54-55). From its analysis we can
emphasize the fact that the higher expenditure took place in Germany, Luxembourg and
Italy, following this order (with amounts between 140 and 70 ECU’s per person at 1993
prices). On the opposite, the four cohesion countries were placed around the 8 ECU’s of
Greece and the 48 of Ireland. In the same way, we can enhance the great similarity
existing between the per capita expenditure in assisted regions in Portugal or Spain
(close to 30 ECU’s) and the one in Netherlands. And it is also to show up the fact that,
in Greece, this expenditure was only slightly higher than the one in Denmark and
France, the countries with the least expenditure.
Definitively, these data show us that the application of this regional policy
instrument not always gives an advantage to the assisted regions in the least developed
countries, compared to the regions in the most developed ones. This fact, closely related
to the different budget capacities of the Member States, will be seen again later on.
Even when the effort realized differs among countries and a generalized trend to
a decrease on the regional incentive expenditure is perceived, it is clear that this type of
aids programmes is commonly used by the European countries (Comisión Europea,
1997a).
But the concession of aids to firms in regions whose countries take part in a
highly developed common market, like the present single market in the EU, can
seriously damage competition. Nevertheless, as it constitutes a necessary instrument to
correct the spatial unbalances, as we will see in the next headline, the Community
competition policy allows the use of these aids, always subjected to certain conditions.7
3. The European Competition Policy and the Regional Aids. Perspectives for Year
2000.
The EU Treaty Articles 92 to 94 constitute the regulating basic normative about
State aids. In general terms, “ … any aid granted by a Member State or through State
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market”
(Article 92 (1)). Even though, sometimes, State aids are, or may be, justified by social,
regional or sectorial reasons. These aids can be compatible with the common market
(Articles 92(2) and 92(3)) because, in these cases, their concession is not considered as a
threat for the free competition conditions.
Specifically, the aids with a regional aim constitute a privileged instrument of
the Member States, in the context of their own economic policies, guided to promote
development in the problem regions. The specific character of this type of aids and the
possibility for certain regions of being granted are collected in Articles 92(3)(a) and
92(3)(c), which constitute one of the possible exceptions of the general rule. In
particular, letter (a) alludes to “aid to promote the economic development of areas
where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious
underemployment” and letter (c) to “aid to facilitate the development of certain
economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely
affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest”. There are,
therefore, two types of regional aids from the compatibility with the common market
point of view: aids to least developed regions, which are not conditioned, and other aids
which are conditioned, due to the exigency of not distorting trading conditions against
the common interest.
Obviously, the letter (a) derogation allows the concession of aids to the more
backward regions in the EU. Nevertheless, there is another set of regions, most of them
located in the more prosperous European countries, which can have economic problems
in spite of their less importance in the Community context. This regions may be
included in letter (c) exception.8
It can be seen from the percentages presented in Table 1 that more than 50% of
industrial aid in the Union is spent on regional objectives. Among these aids more than
eight out of every ten ECUs are going to areas where the living conditions are
particularly low, the so-called Article 92(3)(a) regions. In the so called ‘cohesion
countries’, but Spain, aids are concentrated in letter (a). This concentration is also
perceived as majority in Italy, United Kingdom and Germany. In the last one, most of
the aids are guided to the new länders. The distribution between both letters is similar in
France, and in the rest of the Member States they are mostly or totally canalized through
letter (c).







1990-92 1992-94 1990-92 1992-94 1990-92 1992-94
Total 92.3.a) 92.3.c) Total
Belgium 62 82 29 3 9 0 15 15
Denmark 67 72 31 25 2 0 3 3
Germany 16 15 3 5 81 68 3 80
(*)
Greece 61 60 10 19 29 21 0 21
Spain 39 40 49 43 12 4 13 16
France 66 44 17 38 17 9 9 18
Ireland 31 15 0 11 69 73 0 73
Italy 25 27 18 22 57 48 2 50
Luxembourg 30 30 0 0 70 0 70 70
Netherlands 73 74 10 11 17 0 15 15
Portugal 57 29 33 45 10 26 0 26
United Kingdom 50 35 18 17 31 32 17 48
EUR-12 35 29 15 17 50 45 5 53
(**)
(*) A 9% of total aids were conceded to Berlin/Zonenrand.
(**)  A 4% corresponds to Berlin/Zonenrand in Germany.
SOURCE: European Commission, 1997.
How is it decided what regions can have recourse to both exceptions?. The
European Commission, besides establishing some co-ordination general principles for9
all national regional aids, defined some criteria to determine which specific regions
could be aid assisted. The documents in which this information is collected
1 have been
recently substituted for new Guidelines on National Regional Aid (OJ C 74, 10.3.1998).
These Guidelines, by establishing the exceptional character of regional aids,
follow the spirit of Article 92. In fact, these aids must be moderately used and be
concentrated in the less favoured regions. That is why the Commission has introduced
an overall ceiling on the coverage of regional aid in the Community, in terms of
population. According to this limit, the total coverage of these aids must be less than
50% of the Community population. Concretely, it is aimed to concentrate the aids in a
42.7% of the total EU population, compared to the present 46.7% (where a 22.7%
belongs to letter (a) and a 24% to letter (c)). In this limit, regions included in letter (a)
will have priority due to their abnormally low standard of living or their serious
underemployment. In fact, their coverage is determined in an exogenous and automatic
way.
In this case, no substantial changes are produced in the criteria now used for the
delimitation of the regions. The Commission bases its decisions in the evaluation of the
relative level of the regions’ development. The socio-economic situation of these
regions is evaluated with reference to the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
valued in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). Those regions belonging to NUTS level
II
2 with a less than 75% of the Community average per capita GDP are included in letter
(a). This estimation is made with the average value of the last three years from which we
have data. These regions will not be affected by the population coverage limit pointed
before, as they are determined in an automatic and exogenous way using this
delimitation criterion.
It is in the exception of Article 92(3)(c) where important changes are produced in
terms of regional delimitation.
Firstly, it is emphasized the exceptional character of the aids, as a consequence
of the more favourable relative situation of these regions. It is also limited their
population coverage. The overall ceiling for letter (c) will be calculated as the difference10
between the global limit established by the Commission for the whole EU and the letter
(a) regions’ population. Then, the resultant percentage will be distributed among the
Member States, taking in account the regional disparities in a national and Community
context. This letter has, therefore, a greater scope than the one before. This is because it
allows the Commission to authorize those aids guided to promote the economic
development of the regions with a less favoured position with reference to the national
average.
Another change closely related to the one before is produced in these disparities
measure. This change consists on the setting-up of a distribution key for each Member
State, which finally allows the selection of the assisted regions.
The geographical unit used will still be NUTS level III. For each region, an
average value over three years is calculated for per capita GDP/PPS and unemployment
indicators, defined in relation to the national average. These indicators allow the
estimation of the thresholds used to select the regions.
These thresholds are calculated for each of the two criteria and for each of the
Member States concerned. This calculation is carried out in two stages:
1.  The first stage establishes an identical basic threshold for every Member
State, fixed in 85 for per capita GDP and 115 for the unemployment rate
(being the national average of 100).
 
2.  In the second stage, these thresholds are adjusted to take account of the
relative situation of each Member State compared with the average for the
Community. The formula applied is the following:
)  
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Where the European index refers to the position of the different Member
States, in terms of the concerned indicators, as a percentage of the11
Community average. This European index is an average value over the same
three year period as for the regional indicators.
The better the situation of the Member State, the more selective the thresholds to
choose the regions and vice versa. However, for the unemployment threshold, the new
Guidelines establish a ceiling of 150, with the aim of not being so strict for those
regions which have important unemployment problems at a national level, even when
they are not so serious in the Community context.
Applying the above-mentioned thresholds we will be able to select those regions
that can, at first, belong to letter (c) exception. That is to say, those regions that, at least,
fulfil one of the requirements. But the coverage of this letter has a population limit, as
said before. That is why this fulfilment does not necessarily  mean that all of them are
included in this exception.
For each country, the beneficiary regions according to letter (c) will be
determined through the distribution key. This key is defined as each Member State’s
share of the corresponding total Community population. Therefore, the population
ceiling for each Member State under letter (c) derogation is calculated by multiplying
the distribution key for each Member State by the population ceiling established by the
Commission
3.
It only rests, then, to define which regions will be granted. The Member States
play an important role in this definition. They first decide and then notify to the
Commission, according to Article 93(3), the methodology, the quantitative indicators
they want to use, the proposal for granted regions and the relative aids intensities.
Table 2 shows the ceilings for aids guided to initial investments established by
the Commission. The State Member must fulfil this ceilings, adjusting the regional aid
intensity to reflect the seriousness of the regional problems.
TABLE 2. AID CEILINGS BY GRANTED REGIONS.
(% of investment in terms of Net Grant Equivalent)12
REGIONS  Article 92(3)(a) Per capita GDP (in PPS) £
60% of EU average value
Per capita GDP (in PPS) >
60% of EU average value
General Criterion 50 % 40 %
Derogation: outermost  regions 65 % 50 %
REGIONS  Article 92(3)(c) Per capita GDP (in PPS) £
EU average value and
unemployment ³ EU average
Per capita GDP (in PPS) >
EU average value and
unemployment < EU average
General Criterion 20 % 10 % 
(*)
Derogation: outermost regions or
with low population density.
30 % 20 %
(*) Exceptionally, higher intensities not exceeding the normal ceiling of 20% may be approved for regions
adjoining a region with Article 92(3)(a) status.
SOURCE: OJ C 74, 10.03.1998.
In the same way, the adjustment of the aids according to the nature of the
regional problems is also necessary in case of aids for job creation. Here, the ceiling
established will be a percentage of wage cost of the person hired, calculated over a
period of two years. The percentage will be equal to the intensity allowed for investment
aid in the area.
From the Member States’ proposal, the Commission will elaborate the regional
aid map for a certain period. This period will be, in principle, aligned on the timetable
for Structural Funds assistance. Each State’s map will be periodically reviewed by the
Commission. When regions loose their Article 92(3)(a) status and acquire Article
92(3)(c) status, the Commission could accept, during a four years transitional period, a
progressive reduction of the aids intensities.
4.  The Regional Aids’ Role in the EU  Social and Economic Cohesion.13
The essential characteristic of regional aids, is the positive discrimination on
behalf  of the backward regions. This implies that regional incentives programmes must
be concentrated in the more needy areas, as their incentive character would be lost with
their generalized application. At the same time, the socio-economic situation also differs
among the assisted regions. Then, it is necessary to differentiate the aid ceilings
allowed.
On the other hand, due to the coexistence between the regional aid policies of the
Member States and the EU structural aids, it is required a coherence between them. This
means that the respective maps should coincide as much as possible.
Geographic concentration, differentiated ceilings and a greater coherence with
the EU structural policy will allow a more effective performance of the State aids with
regional aim. And so, they will contribute to reach a greater economic and social
cohesion. At the same time, a higher concentration and lower ceilings for aid
concession, but keeping the relative differences in the intensities, will allow a lower
distortion of free competition, without lessening the previous objective.
This is the course of action presented by the European Commission in its First
Report about the economic and social cohesion (Comisión Europea, 1997a) and,
afterwards, in the “Agenda 2000” (Comisión Europea, 1997b), in the new Guidelines
about the State aids with regional aim (OJ C74, 10.3.98) and in the Commission’s
Communication to the Member States relative to the regional and the competition
policies (OJ C90, 26.3.98).
The reduction of the geographic coverage will not only allow to limit the impact
of the aids on competition, but also improve its economic performance and use more
effectively the limited budget resources of the Member States. In this way, we observe
in the new Guidelines a greater strictness in the selection of the regions that can be
included in Article 92(3)(c) derogation. In fact, the coverage ceiling established in terms
of population falls finally on these regions, so it is possible that not all of the regions
that fulfil the established criteria in terms of thresholds can be included in this
derogation. On the contrary, the normative substituted by the new Guidelines did not14
establish a limit with these characteristics. Even, after a first  stage of analysis in which
the regional level of per capita GDP and unemployment in the Community and national
context were studied, a second stage was applied, in which other regional indicators,
such as net migration, productivity, or the structure of the economic activity, among
others, were taken in account. In these circumstances, those regions situated in the
eligibility limit in the first stage could find, in the second one, a justification for their
regional aids concession.
On the other hand, it is well-known that an effective regional incentives
programme has to adequately discriminate the territories. This means that there has to be
a clear differentiation in the maximum intensities allowed for the aids offered in
different regions, all of it determined by their socio-economic problems’ seriousness.
Until now, the EU competition policy has kept an important discrimination in this sense,
in such a way that the aids volume allowed is significantly higher in regions with an
abnormally low standard of living or serious unemployment problems than in other
assisted areas. But, as the First Report of the economic an social cohesion
indicates(Comisión Europea, 1997a, page 69), the effective volume of the aid allowed is
usually a lot higher than the aid really conceded by the Member States, especially in
Spain and Ireland where, due in part to the resources’ scarcity, only a 40% of the level
allowed is conceded, while in Belgium and Germany it amounts to 60-70%. In
consequence, the advantage that is pretended poorest countries have, is not materialized.
This fact has been one of the reasons for the reduction of the maximum
intensities allowed for the aids, as, in this way, a better adaptation to the real budget
capacity of the countries is produced. Moreover, the effectiveness does not decrease in
case of a reduction of the ceilings but supporting the differences existing among them
and, therefore, the mentioned discrimination. Thus, the reduction benefits to the
competition without lessening the economic and social cohesion. This is what is looked
for with the foreseen reduction on the aid ceilings, detailed in Table 2, as contrasted
with the present limits which are, in theory, a 75% for letter a) regions and a 30% for
letter c) ones, below which,it exists a gradation.15
The new criteria established to select those regions that can be included in letter
c) derogation, also favourably influence the EU economic and social cohesion, by
modifying the calculus mechanism and the application of thresholds. Starting, as we
have seen, from basic thresholds, other modified ones are calculated in every Member
State depending on the relative situation of each country in a Community context in
terms of GDP per inhabitant and unemployment. So, the better the relative situation of
the country, the more strict the thresholds, and vice versa. This implies a
transformation/change into the present way of calculating thresholds, where these are
only modified in the case of countries with a more advantageous situation than the
European average and where, in the rest of the cases, the basic thresholds are applied.
Another aspect which is considered, not only in the new Guidelines, but also in
the other documents enumerated at the beginning of this headline, is the coherence of
regional aids with the Structural Funds’ interventions. This aspect favours, without any
doubt, the economic and social cohesion, specially if the aids are concentrated in the
least developed Community regions.
Tables 3 and 4 show the population covered by the national aids to regions and
by the Structural Funds, respectively. In the first case, the data correspond to year 1996,
while in the second one, they are referred to period 1994-1999. So, we are only able to
make an approximate comparison of both maps. It is clear from the observation of Table
3 that the differences in population coverage among the different EU countries are very
wide. Thus, in the case of Portugal, Greece and Ireland, this reaches 100% and in Spain,
75.9%. In most of the rest Member States, the coverage ranges between 35 and 48,9%,
with the exception of Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands, where it is situated below
20%.
TABLE 3. POPULATION COVERED BY THE NATIONAL AID TO REGIONS, 199616
(in per cent)
Country Global coverage Art. 92 (3)(a) Regions Art. 92 (3)(c) Regions
Greece 100.0 100.0 0.0
Ireland 100.0 100.0 0.0
Portugal 100.0 100.0 0.0
Spain 75.9 59.6 16.3
Italy 48.9 34.2 14.7
Luxembourg 42.7 0.0 42.7
France 42.4 2.5 39.9
Finland 41.6 0.0 41.6
United Kingdom 38.1 2.9 35.2
Germany 37.6 20.8 16.8
Ostrich 35.2 3.5 31.7
Belgium 35.0 0.0 35.0
Denmark 19.9 0.0 19.9
Sweden 18.5 0.0 18.5
Netherlands 17.3 0.0 17.3
SOURCE: Comisión Europea, 1997a.
Nowadays, as it can be seen in Table 4, four regionalized objectives exist:
objective 1, destined to the development of the backward EU regions; objective 2, to the
reconversion  of declining industrial zones; objective 5b, destined to the development of
rural zones and objective 6 to zones with very low population density. In global terms,
again Portugal, Greece and Ireland have their population completely covered, while in
Spain the coverage is higher than the one corresponding to the regional aids map, a
84.5%. This also happens in the rest of the EU countries, with the exception of Belgium
and Denmark, where it is lower, and Luxembourg, where the coverage percentage is
almost the same. Also in this case, Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands are the countries
with the lowest coverage, being in each case below 26%.
TABLE 4. POPULATION ASSISTED BY STRUCTURAL FUNDS OBJECTIVES (1994-1999)
(in per cent)17
Country Total Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 5b Objective 6
Greece 100.0 100.0 - - -
Ireland 100.0 100.0 - - -
Portugal 100.0 100.0 - - -
Spain 84.5 59.7 20.4 4.4 -
Italy 56.0 36.7 11.0 8.3 -
Luxembourg 42.5 0.0 34.6 7.9 -
France 46.2 4.4 25.1 16.7 -
Finland 54.0 0.0 15.7 21.6 16.7
U. Kingdom 41.7 5.9 30.9 4.9 -
Germany 39.1 20.6 8.8 9.7 -
Ostrich 39.9 3.7 7.5 28.7 -
Belgium 31.5 12.8 14.2 4.5 -
Denmark 15.3 0.0 8.5 6.8 -
Sweden 26.0 0.0 11.5 9.2 5.3
Netherlands 24.3 1.5 17.4 5.4 -
SOURCE: Comisión Europea, 1997a.
Not only there is no coincidence between the percentage of population covered
by both aids maps, but also exists some inconsistencies between them. This is because
some regions, granted by the Structural Funds, cannot be at the same time beneficiary of
the State aids, and vice versa.
As it can be seen in Table 5, again in an approximate way, the population
assisted by the Structural Funds is nowadays slightly higher (50.6% of the total) than the
one included in the regional aids’ map (46.7% of the total). A 6.6% of the Community
population live in  regions subsidized by the Structural Funds but where the competition
policy does not authorize the aids with regional aim. On the contrary, a 2.7% belongs to
regions where such aids are allowed, but structural aids are not received.
TABLE 5. CONSISTENCY BETWEEN REGIONS RECEIVING AID FROM STRUCTURAL
FUNDS AND ZONES WHERE REGIONAL AIDS ARE AUTHORIZED.
(in percentage  of EU population)18
Regions receiving aid from
Structural Funds.








aids are not authorized
(Art. 92.3)
6.6 46.7 53.3
TOTAL 50.6 49.4 100.0
SOURCE: OJ C90, 26.3.1998.
The Commission’s Communication “The links between regional and
competition policy. Reinforcing concentration and mutual consistency” (OJ C90,
26.3.1998) summarizes this situation in the following way: in the context of the new
guidelines on regional aid schemes and the forthcoming reform of the Structural Funds,
the Commission reviews the inconsistencies between the areas receiving national aid
and those receiving aid from the Structural Funds, and indicates the action it intends to
take during the next programming period (2000-2006) to ensure the required
consistency at these two levels. This communication follows on from Agenda 2000, in
which the Commission stressed the need to increase the geographical concentration of
structural assistance and make it more consistent with the Union’s competition policy.
From year 2000, every regional aids map and regional incentives programme
must be compatible with the new Guidelines. Also from year 2000, the new
programming period (2000-2006) of the Structural Funds will be initiated. This
temporary coincidence shows the mentioned Community interest in looking for a
consistency between the decisions adopted in terms of  the competition policy and the
ones relative to the regions that can receive aids from the Structural Funds.
The coherence means, in words of the proper European Commission, that, in
principle, any region receiving aid from the Structural Funds from year 1999 could also
be beneficiary of State aids with regional aim.19
The “Agenda 2000”, as well as the proposal for the Reform of the Structural
Funds, propose to reduce the percentage of population in the EU regions that can receive
aids according to the new Objectives 1 and 2. These are the only ones that will be
regional objectives in the new programming period. In particular, this population should
be reduced from the present 51% to a quantity between 35% and 40% of the total. It is
clear that this percentage will be lower than the coverage that can be granted according
to Article 92(3)(a) and 92(3)(c). This percentage, as we have seen before, will have to be
reduced, also from year 2000, to a 42.7% of the total population. In the same way, there
must be a total coincidence between Objective 1 regions and regions aided by the
Member States under Article 92(3)(a). Thus, the criterion of Objective 1 delimitation,
per capita GDP/PPS lower than a 75% of the Community average value, should be
strictly applied. As for Objective 2 regions, the Member States will have to propose, so
as to belong to this objective, only those areas also proposed for Article 92(3)(c)
derogation. So, the Objective 2 map will be included in the one for letter (c). This
strategy still leaves, therefore, some limited areas to the Member States in order to
finance some regions not covered by the EU Structural Funds.
5. In conclusion.
Throughout this paper, we have realized a detailed exposition of the foreseen
changes in terms of regional aids from year 2000. To sum up, these changes imply a
modification of the normative corresponding to the competition policy: (i) by
concentrating the aids in the least developed regions and (ii) by reducing their absolute
intensities, but maintaining the relative differences among regions. Thereby, their
effectiveness to achieve the economic and social cohesion increases and, at the same
time, the competition distortion decreases. On the other hand, these changes also pursue
to promote a higher coherence with the application of the EU Structural aids.
However, the coherence of the maps will not be strict. In fact, it will be conceded
a certain control margin for the Member States to include in Article 92(3)(c) derogation
regions not assisted by the Structural Funds. Probably, the aids will be guided, in this
case, to regions without a very unfavourable socio-economic situation in the
Community context.20
On the other side of the group of European regions that can receive regional aids,
we find the least developed ones in the Community. The differences between these and
the previous ones are obvious. As a consequence of their less socio-economic
development, they present a set of lacks that penalize the enterprises’ location. Among
all of them we could emphasize a weaker firm infrastructure, less developed suppliers
networks, a lower endowment of firm services and the distance from the most important
European markets. All this, therefore, has to be compensated with higher aid levels.
This aspect is treated in the Community normative as, as we have seen, the
intensity allowed is markedly higher. But, as we have also pointed, the volume that, in
theory, aids can reach, differs a lot from their real volume, mainly because of the limited
budget capacity of the poorest Member States. However, thanks to the EU Structural
Funds’ aid, these countries have improved their possibilities to finance regional
incentive programmes, due to the co-financing lines with this aim. This is, definitively,
an important aspect of the Community regional policy which, without any doubt, also
contributes to improve the economic and social cohesion. The co-ordination among
regional policies goes further that the only map coincidence. It has to be also
represented in an integrated performance of both of them that will redound to a
reinforcement of the European solidarity.
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